Non-competition agreements are contracts signed by employees and firms that prohibit employees from joining or forming a rival company after splitting from the firm. Stricter enforcement of such contracts may induce firms to undertake riskier R&D projects, leading to technological breakthroughs or dead ends. Specifically, non-competition agreements reduce the risk that the firm loses the fruits of inventive activity by its employees, such that when the enforcement of non-compete covenants is stricter, firms grant corporate inventors more freedom to explore risky but high-potential research paths. This study uses data about U.S. patent applications between 1990 and 2000 to identify the impact of non-competition agreements and considers both cross-state and longitudinal variation in the enforcement of non-compete clauses. The empirical findings are mainly consistent with theory and show that in states with stricter enforcement, companies are more likely to undertake risky and potentially path-breaking R&D projects than in states that do not enforce non-compete agreements as strictly.
INTRODUCTION

Any competitive advantage created by introducing an innovation would be transitory if
proprietary knowledge could easily spill over to competitors. Companies can use different mechanisms to safeguard their idiosyncratic technological competences (Levin et al. 1987) , including the protections granted by patent or copyright laws. Yet, some technological knowhow sticks to individual employees, and the most effective way organizations can retain such knowledge is by preventing researchers from joining a rival, such as through non-competition contractual agreements (hereafter, non-competes) . Non-competes are in fact widely used in contracts of scientists, engineers and technology executives. In United States, almost 70% of entrepreneurs receiving venture capital financing are required to sign non-competition clauses with the venture capital firms (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003) , whereas about 80% of newly hired IT professionals are asked to sign a non-compete contract (Holley 1998) .
Given the importance and diffusion of non-competes, a natural question is how they affect firms' R&D strategy. One might expect that a stronger enforcement of non-competes should induce companies to invest more in R&D. However, previous research does not find any significant relationship between the enforcement of non-competes and the amount of company R&D expenditure (Garmaise 2009 ). Extant work does not focus on the type of R&D though. Designing an R&D strategy actually means choosing not just how much to invest but also how to invest, and a crucial choice concerns the degree of riskiness of the R&D activity (Cabral 2003) . In this respect, anecdotal evidence suggests that non-competes may in fact create incentives to undertake risky but high-potential R&D paths. Brian Halligan, CEO of Hubspot -one of the most successful software companies in Boston -, notes that his company is "super entrepreneurial" and persistently develops novel technological solutions precisely because the non-competes that employees sign "encourage new thought about the way Hubspot does business" 1 . Consistent with this evidence, I propose that in regions in which such non-competes are enforced more strictly, firms likely undertake riskier R&D paths, implying a higher likelihood of achieving extremely valuable inventions (i.e., technological breakthroughs), but also a higher probability of failure. I also propose that non-compete enforcement affects the direction of research efforts, inducing firms to undertake projects in new technological areas. I predict these effects because non-compete contracts reduce outbound mobility and knowledge leakages to competitors. As a result, a stronger enforcement of non-competes makes high-risk R&D projects relatively more valuable than low-risk ones.
To test this prediction, I gather data about U.S. patents applications by public companies during 1990-2000. I identify the impact of non-competes by considering both cross-state and longitudinal variation in U.S. non-compete enforcement. The findings indicate that in states with stricter non-compete enforcement companies choose riskier R&D paths, such that corporate inventions are more likely to lie in the tails of the inventions' value distribution (as breakthroughs or failures), and to be in novel technological areas.
The contribution of this study to the strategy literature is threefold. First, the study shows how the strategy and competitive advantage of firms depend on the institutional environment in which they are embedded (Ingram and Silverman 2002; Furman 2003) . In particular this work theorizes and provides evidence that in regions where non-competes are enforced more strictly, companies tend to choose riskier R&D paths, eventually leading to technological breakthroughs. Second, within the strategic entrepreneurship literature, this study points out that non-competes, while reducing the formation of new companies (e.g., Samila and Sorenson 2010) , might stimulate corporate entrepreneurship, as they induce managers to explore novel and potentially path-breaking technological solutions. From a policy perspective, this implies that non-competition agreements may create, at the regional level, a trade-off between entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship. Finally, the study extends the growing stream of research that examines the determinants of inventive breakthroughs (e.g., Ahuja and Lampert 2001; Phene, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Marsch 2005; Fleming and Singh 2010) . The interest in breakthroughs is mainly motivated by the skewed distribution of inventions' value, with a small minority of inventions accounting for a disproportionate share of value (Gambardella, Harhoff and Verspagen 2008) . In this context, non-competes enhance the likelihood of any inventive outcome being extremely profitable.
BACKGROUND AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT
For firms competing in knowledge intensive industries a key strategic problem involves However, companies use different mechanisms to limit unintended knowledge spillovers to rivals (Levin et al. 1987) , including the protections granted by patent or copyright laws. Tacit knowledge also can be protected by embedding it in organizational practices and routines (Nelson and Winter 1982 ). Yet some knowledge may be inherent to individual members of the organization, in which case it is difficult to share throughout the organization. The most effective way firms can retain such knowledge is by restricting the possibility of employees to leave the company, such as through non-competes. These contracts, signed by employees and firms, forbid employees to join a competitor or form a new company, usually for a specified period of time or geographic location. The historical origins of modern non-competes stem from England. In 1711, a court allowed partial restraints on workers' mobility in certain circumstances. This "partial restraint logic" seemed spread in the United States in the nineteenth century; by the start of the twentieth century, U.S. courts generally considered non-competes enforceable, if they were within the boundaries of "reasonableness standards." Although most U.S. states thus allow some form of non-competition contracts, their enforcement varies substantially. For example, in California non-compete agreements are not enforceable, and in Texas they are valid only if employees receive some ancillary compensation for entering into them. The geographical reach and duration of a non-compete also vary in different jurisdictions. In most states, a noncompete contract cannot specify a time restriction greater than two years, but Pennsylvania courts routinely accept three-year non-compete covenants.
The social desiderability of non-competes is on debate. On one hand, Gilson (1999) argues that Silicon Valley's entrepreneurial growth mainly reflects California's proscription of non-competes. Stuart and Sorenson (2003) confirm that liquidity events, such as acquisitions or initial public offerings, increase the number of new firms, especially in areas where non-compete covenants are forbidden. Along similar lines, Samila and Sorenson (2010) show that the positive impact of the supply of venture capital on both the number of new firms, inventions and employment is significantly greater in regions that do not enforce non-compete agreements strictly. On the other hand, the knowledge protection provided by non-competes may be essential in the emergent stages of a new industry for stimulating both entrepreneurship and innovation (Franco and Mitchell 2008) .
The macro implications of non-competes for regional growth and performance have been extensively dealt with the literature. However, their implications for companies' R&D strategies have been largely neglected, despite the fact that firms use widely non-compete clauses in contracts of scientists, engineers and technology executives. In United States, almost 70% of entrepreneurs receiving venture capital financing are required to sign noncompetition clauses with the venture capital firms (Kaplan and Stromberg 2003) , while about 80% of newly hired IT professionals are asked to sign a non-compete contract (Holley 1998 ).
How do non-competes affect company R&D strategy? A straightforward economic argument would suggest that companies should invest more in R&D if non-competes are enforced more strictly, as non-competes increase the ability to capture the value created by
innovating. Yet, it does not exist any significant relationship between non-compete enforcement and the amount of company R&D expenditure (Garmaise 2009 ). This finding is less surprising than it might initially seem if we consider the conflicting results produced by the literature about the impact of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) on company expenditure in R&D (e.g., Ginarte and Park 1997; Sakakibara and Branstetter 2001; Kanwar and Emerson 2003; Qian 2007) . While Kanwar and Emerson (2003) show that firms in countries with stronger IPR tend to invest more in R&D, Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) , does not find any significant relation between IPR rights and corporate R&D expenditure.
Rather than focusing on the sheer amount of R&D as the relevant outcome (an aspect already treated in the literature), I attempt to understand how non-competes affect the type of R&D activity pursued by companies. As Cabral (2003) I argue that non-competes might stimulate the experimentation with riskier R&D paths because the profit decrease due to outbound mobility is relatively higher for riskier projects. Hence non-competes, by reducing outbound mobility, make high-risk R&D projects relatively more valuable than low-risk ones. To make the point clear, consider the following situation. There are two R&D projects with the same initial expected value. The first R&D project A is safe and produces a positive profit a with probability 1. The second R&D project B is risky and it will generate a positive profit b with a probability of p, but it will produce an economic loss L with a probability of (1 -p The enforcement of non-competes also affects the direction of research endeavors. Firms can choose whether to undertake projects closely related to their preexisting knowledge base, or to pursue projects distant from the current technological know-how. This choice has implications for the distribution of rewards to the inventive activity, as the exploration of novel technological competences is usually riskier than the exploitation of existing know-how. As March puts, it "compared to returns from exploitation, returns from exploration are systematically less certain" (March 1991, p.73 Concluding, a stronger enforcement of non-competes should be reflected in undertaking riskier R&D projects, i.e. projects whose outcome has a higher probability of both being a breakthrough and a failure. Moreover, a stronger non-compete enforcement should also lead companies to produce inventions in technological domains distant from the current technological know-how of the organization.
METHODS
Sample and data
To investigate how the enforcement of non-competes affects firms' inventive outcomes, I gathered a data set that includes all granted patents whose application was filed in the United
States by a public firm during 1990-2000. In particular, I focused on patented inventions whose first inventor resides in a U.S. state; similar to prior work (e.g., been excluded from the analysis. However, the alternative solution of using a longer time window was even worse for at least two reasons. First, using data before 1985 would mean the impossibility to assign any patent to the correct organization, because SDC, used in order identify the ownership structure of public companies over time, is reliable only from 1986 3 .
Second, the last version of the NBER patent database includes information about all patents granted until December 2006. Thus it is impossible to get a reliable measure of the number of forward citations received by patents applied after 2004.
Measures
The empirical analysis pertains to the invention level. Therefore, I estimated the impact of the strength of non-compete enforcement in a certain state on the likelihood that an invention produced by an inventor residing in that state is a breakthrough (H1), a failure (H2), or in a new technological area (H3).
Dependent variables
Breakthroughs are extremely valuable inventions, so I measured inventive breakthroughs according to the number of forward citations received by a patent since the year of its application. The number of citations correlates with several measures of technological and economic value, including consumer surplus generated (Trajtenberg 1990 ), expert evaluations of patent value (Albert et al. 1991), patent renewal rates (Harhoff et al. 1999 ), contribution to an organization's market value (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005) , and inventors' assessments of economic value (Gambardella et al. 2008) . whereas the non-competition enforcement index score for Texas was 5 before 1994, it fell to 3 after the decision. The Florida law change instead resulted from actions by the state legislature, which in May 1996 replaced the state's existing law regulating non-competes. As a result of this change, its enforcement index increased from 7 to 9. Audretsch and Feldman 1996) , and contributing to them (Shaver and Flyer 2000) . To control for other time-invariant characteristics that might correlate with the enforcement of non-competes and affect the inventive performance of companies (e.g., presence of universities, cultural factors), I included a state dummy variable. -
Control variables
-------------------------- Insert table 1 about here ---------------------------
Empirical strategy
To identify the impact of non-compete agreements on inventive outcomes, I adopted two methods. First, I used the longitudinal and cross-sectional variation in the non-compete enforcement index elaborated by Garmaise (2009) to assess the economic and statistical significance of an increase in the enforceability of non-competition agreements. Second, I
exploited the quasi-natural experiments provided by Texas and Florida and adopted a difference-in-differences regression method, such that I separately estimated the impacts of an increase of non-compete enforcement (Florida in 1996) and a decrease of such enforcement (Texas in 1994).
Variation in non-compete enforcement index
I first only considered longitudinal variations in non-compete enforcement, by including as controls state dummies. With H1, I posited that non-compete enforcement should increase the chance of any invention being a breakthrough. Because this dependent variable is binary, I used a logistic regression, with the assumption that there is a latent variable . I did not observe directly but can observe a binary outcome y, such that , where is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the condition within parenthesis is satisfied, is a vector of variables that influence linearly, is a vector of parameters, and represent a logistically distributed stochastic component.
Using a logistic model, I estimated the impact of the enforcement of non-competes on the probability that a certain invention j, generated by company i in state s at time t, will be path-
where X is the vector of all covariates; Enforcement st the strength of non-compete enforcement in a certain state s at time t; Z is the vector of control variables, including state fixed effects; and e jist is the stochastic component. If H1 is supported, α should be greater than 0. Because the use of micro-data to estimate the impact of a variable that affects a group of observations may produce spurious predictions of the statistical significance of the variable of interest, I followed Moulton (1989) and clustered the errors at the state level to allow for intra-group correlations in the disturbances of observations that refer to the same state.
I also have predicted that non-compete enforcement increases the probability of an invention being a failure (H2) and in a new technological area (H3). The dependent variables again are dichotomous, so I used a logit model, with standard errors clustered at the state level, to estimate the predicted impacts:
,
and
In both Equations (2) and (3), α is expected to be positive. To take unobserved firm heterogeneity into account, as a robustness check, I also estimated equations (1), (2) and (3) using a linear probability model with firm fixed effects 6 . As Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) show, the linear probability model gives unbiased results if the predicted probabilities lie between zero and one.
The problem with using just the longitudinal variations in non-compete enforcement is that only few changes are taken into account. Nevertheless, using the non-compete enforcement index without state fixed effects would make it impossible to distinguish the effect of non-compete enforcement from the impact of other time-invariant factors at the state-level. Thus, similarly to Garmaise (2009) 
.
Garmaise (2009) and Samila and Sorenson (2010) assume that, once the interaction term is included in the regression, non-compete enforcement does not have any direct impact on the outcome variables: Thus they exclude non-compete enforcement as a stand-alone variable from the regression. Since this assumption might not hold, I test that α is greater than zero in the previous equations (4), (5) and (6), both including and excluding non-compete enforcement from the vector of controls Z. Moreover, as a robustness check, I also used linear probability models with firm fixed effects.
Difference-in-differences approach
With a difference-in-differences methodology, I exploited the quasi-natural experiments provided by Texas and Florida to estimate separately the impact of two opposite "treatments": a decrease of non-compete enforcement in Texas in 1994 and an enforcement increase in Florida in 1996. To the extent that changes in non-compete regulation are neither influenced nor predicted by individuals, such treatments can be considered truly exogenous.
For Texas, this consideration is likely true, because the change in non-compete enforcement was generated by a Texas Supreme Court decision. It is therefore reasonable that companies
were not aware of the decision the Court was going to make. The change in Florida, in contrast, resulted from the actions of the state legislature, so companies probably were aware of the possible change, because it had been widely debated (Marx, Strumsky and Fleming 2009 
In these equations, (TX*Post1994) is the treatment, in that TX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for inventions in Texas and 0 otherwise, and Post1994 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for inventions applied for in the period after 1994 and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, Z is the vector of controls. The α estimator involves the following interpretation: Suppose that Equation (7) were a linear, rather than logistic, regression. Let denote the sample average probability that inventions generated in Texas after 1994 were breakthrough inventions. Let represent the same probability for inventions generated in the rest of the United States. Finally, let denote the average probability that inventions generated in Texas before 1994 were path breaking and is that value for other states. Then:
Therefore, if Equation (8) were a linear regression, α would estimate how much the probability of breakthrough inventions in Texas changed after the court decision to decrease non-compete enforcement, compared with the equivalent change in the rest of the U.S. states.
The problem is that the model represented by Equation (7) is logistic, and the parameter α is a coefficient of the interaction term between the group (TX) and time (Post1994) dummies. Ai and Norton (2003) suggest that in nonlinear models, the coefficient of the interaction term is not a meaningful indicator of the real impact of the interaction variable. However, Puhani (2008) proves that in a nonlinear difference-in-differences model with a strictly monotonic transformation function of a linear index (e.g., probit, logit, or tobit), the treatment effect is 0 if and only if the coefficient of the interaction term between the group and time dummy is 0.
Moreover, the sign of the treatment effect is equal to the sign of the interaction term.
Therefore, even if in Equation (7) α does not represent the impact of the treatment precisely, it is appropriate to focus on it to verify the sign of the treatment effect. In Texas, the treatment involves a reduction of non-compete enforcement, so I expect α to be negative in Equations (7), (8) and (9), consistent with H1-H3.
For Florida, which experienced increasing enforcement in 1996, I excluded observations referring to Texas and estimated the following regressions:
In these equations, FL is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for inventions in Florida and 0 otherwise, and Post1996 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for inventions applied for in the period after 1996 and 0 otherwise. For Florida, the treatment entails an increase in noncompete enforcement, so I expect α to be positive in Equations (11), (12), and (13).
One potential pitfall of difference-in-differences estimation is inconsistency in standard errors, due to serial correlation among observations, which may be extremely high if the analysis includes several periods of time. This issue may lead to an indication of spurious statistical significance in the treatment. Therefore, I adopted the strategy suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan. (2004) and clustered the errors at the level of the treatment, that is, the state level.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Tables 2 and 3 contain the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among variables.
Consistent with prior research (Stuart and Sorenson 2003) , I find a negative correlation between the enforcement of non-competes and the degree of technological competition, as measured by log of the number of firms inventing in the same technological class, year and state of the focal patent. The correlation between non-compete enforcement and the probability that an invention is a breakthrough is negative; however, this result may reflect other variables at the state level that correlate negatively with the degree of non-compete enforcement but positively with inventive performance. As a concrete example, California forbids non-competes, but its culture, which promotes knowledge exchanges and risk taking, allows many California companies to produce path-breaking inventions (Saxenian 1994 ).
Ignoring other state-level variables would mistakenly attribute to non-competes a negative impact on the probability of achieving technological breakthroughs.
There is a strong correlation between the size of firms' knowledge stock (log of the number of patents), firm technological diversification and the number of employees.
However, potential multicollinearity problems are lessened by the large number of observations in the sample.
---------------------------
Insert tables 2 and 3 about here ---------------------------
Variation in non-compete enforcement index
The results pertaining to H1 and H2 appear in Tables 4 and 5 . Specifically, in support of H1, enforcement of non-competes significantly increases the probability that an invention will be a breakthrough according to the logistic model (model a, Table 4 ). Keeping the covariates at their mean, a one standard deviation (2.151) increase in non-compete enforcement enhances the probability of any invention being a breakthrough from 7% to almost 9%. This increase in non-compete enforcement is similar in magnitude to the actual change in Florida, where enforcement increased from 7 to 9, and in Texas, where enforcement fell from 5 to 3 on the index. A jump in the enforcement index from 0 (minimum) to 9 (maximum in the sample)
would raise the probability of a breakthrough from 7% to approximately 14%. The sign of non-compete enforcement remains positive and statistically significant even when controlling for firm fixed effects in the linear probability model (model d, Table 5 ). It also is interesting to note the results of the models considering the interaction between non-compete enforcement and intra-state technological competition (model b, c, e and f, Table 5 ): The effect of non-competes enforcement on the likelihood of any invention being path-breaking is even stronger when the number of technological competitors increase.
Also in support of H2, greater non-compete enforcement raises the likelihood that any invention will fail, based on the results of the logistic model (model a, Table 5 ). A one standard deviation increase in non-compete enforcement raises the probability of failure by almost 2.5%, such that at the sample mean of all variables the probability of an extremely poor outcome increases from almost 8.7% to 11.2%. The linear probability model confirms that non-competes significantly increase the probability of extremely poor outcomes (model d, Table 5 ). Also the models considering the interaction between non-compete enforcement and the number of technological competitors in the state suggest that non-competes increase the probability of producing worthless inventions, especially in states with many technological competitors (model b, c, e and f, Table 5 ).
---------------------------Insert tables 4 & 5 about here ---------------------------
To sum up, results corroborate the idea that non-competes create incentive to invest in riskier R&D projects, i.e. projects that ex post turn out to be breakthroughs or failures.
However, the ex ante distribution observed by managers when they choose the R&D project type may somehow differs from the ex post distribution of the inventive outcome. Thus I also explore the impact of non-compete on some ex ante measure of riskiness, such as the exploration of novel technological area. Accordingly to H3, I find that non-competes increase the explorative nature of corporate inventions. In particular, the logistic model reveals that non-compete enforcement significantly increases the likelihood that any invention occurs in a new technological area for a company (model a, Table 6 ). When the non-compete enforcement index increases from 0 to 9, the likelihood of an invention appearing in a new technological domain rises about 5.5% (covariates at their mean) to 7.5%.
For a more realistic prediction, a one standard deviation increase of non-compete enforceability increases the probability of an invention being in a new domain from 5.5% to about 6% (a 9% relative increase). In the linear probability model controlling for firm fixed effects the association between non-compete enforcement and the explorative nature of an invention remains positive but is not significant (model d, Table 6 ). However, models considering the interaction between non-compete enforcement and intra-state technological competition, (model b, c, e and f, Table 6 ), corroborate the hypothesis that non-competes induce firms to undertake project in novel technological areas.
---------------------------Insert table 6 about here ---------------------------
Difference-in-differences approach
The results from the difference-in-differences estimation provide additional support for my proposed theory. A crucial assumption underlying the difference-in-differences technique is that differences in the outcome variables between the treated and the control group would have remained constant without the treatment. Both visual inspection of trends and a t-test of differences in trends before the treatment indicate that this assumption is viable. Table 7 contains the results for Texas. Consistent with H1 and H2, the decrease in non-compete enforcement led to a lower likelihood of any invention being path-breaking and a failure. Moreover, in line with H3, when non-compete agreements were enforced less strictly, the probability of any invention being occurring in a novel technological area for a company declined.
For Florida, the results in Table 8 again confirm the predicted outcomes. Specifically, the greater non-compete enforcement after 1996 augmented the likelihood of any invention being path-breaking (H1), a failure (H2), and in a new technological domains (H3).
Robustness checks
The difference-in differences analysis described in the previous section may raise some concerns. First, using all US states as control group may be problematic, as such a control group might not be able to reproduce the counterfactual (that is how the treated state would have evolved in the absence of any change in the enforcement of non-competes). Second, due to the non-linearity of the empirical models, the coefficient of the interaction term does not provide a good estimate of the real impact of the treatment (Puhani 2008) . Third, even if I found that the impact of the treatment is statistically significant, I cannot totally rule out the possibility that results are somehow driven by chance. In particular I am not able to say how often I would obtain results of this magnitude by choosing a state at random. The issue concerning the statistical significance of the treatment is exacerbated by the use of a very large sample, which may provide even small economic effects with statistical significance.
The synthetic control method (SCM) developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), can be promisingly applied in order to tackle the previous issues. This method constructs a weighted combination of potential control US states (namely, the synthetic control) in order to approximate the most relevant characteristics of the states affected by the intervention (that is Texas and Florida).
The weights are chosen so that the pre-treatment outcome and the covariates of the synthetic control are, on average, very similar to those of the treated states. In order to understand how SCM works, assume that there is a panel of N+1 regions over T periods. Only state i receives a treatment at T0<T. The treatment effect for region i at time t is: (14) where is the outcome that would be observed for region i at time t in the absence of the intervention, and is the actual outcome for region i at time t after the intervention.
Suppose that is given by a factor model: (15) where is a vector of relevant observed covariates that are not affected by the intervention and can be either time-invariant or time varying; is a vector of parameters; is a statespecific unobservable; is an unknown common factor varying over time and are transitory shocks with zero mean.
Define as a generic vector of weights such that and .
Further, define as a generic linear combination of pre-treatment outcomes.
Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) show that, as long we can choose such that and (16) then:
is an unbiased estimator of the treatment .
The main advantages of SCM are that it gives an unbiased estimate of the impact of the treatment, and it also successfully deals also with the endogeneity problem caused by the The synthetic control approach also allows to assess the statistical significance of the treatment through a series of "placebo tests". I applied the synthetic control method to every potential state in the sample. This iterative procedure provided with a distribution of estimated effects of "placebo" treatment for states where no actual treatment took place, such 7 I used the regional division defined by the United States Census Bureau, which divides the US in four macro regions: Northeast, South, West, Midwest (http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf). 8 The rationale is excluding those states with a null proportion of inventions in new technological areas (or of breakthroughs and failures) merely due to a small number of observations. Different cutoffs (20, 30, 40 inventions) give similar results.
that it is possible to examine whether or not the estimated effect of the real intervention is large relative to the distribution of the "placebo" effects for the regions not exposed to the intervention. Following Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) -
As a further robustness check, I also considered the extent to which the results might be sensitive to different measures of the dependent variables. I therefore replicated the empirical analyses using a measure of breakthrough that indicated the patent was in the top 1% or 3% (rather than 5%) of the value distribution of patents applied for in the same year and in the same IPC four-digit class. The results were similar (details are available on request). The findings also were robust to a different measure of a new technological domain, namely, a measure with respect to patented inventions produced by the company in the previous three or four (rather than five) years.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
While previous research has extensively studied the implications of non-compete agreements for regional growth and performance, far less is known about the impact of such contracts on firms' strategies. This study investigates the impact of non-competition agreements on the type of R&D activity undertaken by companies. I showed that in areas where non-compete agreements are enforced more strictly, the likelihood that corporate inventions will be explorative and path-breaking is greater. However, I also have found that a greater probability of achieving great inventive successes is accompanied by a greater probability of extremely poor outcomes.
This work accordingly offers several key contributions to prior literature. First, I
provide relevant insights into how the strategy and competitive advantage of firms depends on the institutional environment in which they are embedded (see also Ingram and Silverman 2002; Furman 2003) . With regard to innovative performance, Hall and Soskice (2001) suggest that in liberal market economies (e.g., U.S., U.K.), due to more labor turnover companies innovate more radically than they do in coordinated-market countries (e.g., Germany, France), where firms instead specialize in incremental, less risky innovation.
However, this study provides evidence that in regions where non-competes are enforced more strictly, and thus mobility is limited, corporate inventions actually tend to be radical and pathbreaking.
Second, this study offers interesting findings for entrepreneurship literature, which previously has considered non-competition agreements mainly as barriers to the formation of new companies, seemingly decreasing technological variety and risk-taking in a region. My study suggests that the strong appropriability regime determined by non-competes stimulate corporate entrepreneurship, inducing managers to experiment and explore risky and potentially path-breaking technological solutions. Thus non-competes, by increasing the degree of technological exploration and risk-taking within companies, might indirectly increase the degree of exploration and risk-taking within regions that host such companies.
This last result is consistent with some recent research that reevaluates the situation and shows that non-competition agreements, by providing entrepreneurs with protection of their ideas, actually can foster regional innovation and growth (Franco and Mitchell 2008) .
Third, I offer insights for the growing stream of research that examines the tails of inventions' value distribution, rather than the average value of inventions (e.g., Ahuja and Lampert 2001; Fleming and Singh 2010; Girotra et al. 2010) . The interest in the tails is mainly motivated by the skewed distribution of inventions' value, with a small minority of inventions accounting for a disproportionate share of value (Gambardella, Harhoff and Verspagen 2008) . Non-competes enhance the likelihood that any single invention will lie in the tails of the inventions' value distribution, as a breakthrough or a failure. In this sense, this study also contributes to literature pertaining to the impact of legal appropriability regimes on inventive performance (e.g., Ginarte and Park 1997; Sakakibara and Branstetter 2001; Kanwar and Emerson 2003; Qian 2007 ). Further studies also should consider how intellectual property laws might affect not only the average inventive performance but also the tails of the inventive outcome distribution.
Some limitations of this study are worth noting. First, the study is based on the assumption that companies actually use non-competes. If this was not true, any increase in the enforcement of non-competes would not influence company R&D choices. However, the evidence provided by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and Holley (1998) indicate that companies extensively use non-competes whenever it is possible. Moreover, the restriction of the sample to public companies indicates the need to conduct studies with private companies, which likely differ from public companies along several dimensions. For instance, the ownership structure of a firm may influence its corporate risk taking (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; May 1995) . As a result, the same degree of non-compete enforcement may exert a different impact on corporate decisions to pursue risky but high potential R&D projects, depending on the private or public ownership of the firm. Furthermore, I measured inventive performance using forward citations to patents, which creates a biased measure of failure. That is, I can only observe patented inventions receiving no forward citations, but I cannot observe "real" failures, such as R&D projects that do not lead to any patented inventions. Using forward citations has also another shortcoming. As non-competes reduce inventors' mobility, they may have a direct negative impact on the amount of forward citations, which are also a proxy for knowledge spillovers. However, this would goes against the finding that in states where non-compete enforcement is stricter corporate inventions are more likely to be extremely valuable.
Despite these limitations, this study offers relevant implications for managers and policymakers. From a firm strategic perspective, in the short run legal institutions are usually beyond the control of firms, but in the long run they may be the object of organizational strategies (Ingram and Silverman 2002) . Managers could attempt to modify formal institutions, such as through lobbying activities. Companies operating in highly uncertain technological environments (i.e., where the outcomes of R&D projects is more variable) have more to gain from a stronger appropriability regime, so they should lobby for increasing the enforcement of non-competes.
From a policy perspective, non-competition agreements may create, at the regional level, a trade-off between entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship. Non-competes likely limit the formation of new companies, which might create technological variety in a region.
However, non-competes also increase the degree of technological exploration by companies and the likelihood that corporate inventions will be path-breaking. Therefore, the extent to which policymakers should favor exploration by entrepreneurship rather than exploration by intrapreneurship remains an interesting question for further research. 
